When the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates binds, monetary policy cannot provide appropriate stimulus. We show that in the standard New Keynesian model, tax policy can deliver such stimulus at no cost and in a time-consistent manner. There is no need to use ine¢ cient policies such as wasteful public spending or future commitments to in ‡ate. We conclude that in the New Keynesian model, the zero bound on nominal interest rates is not a relevant constraint on both …scal and monetary policy.
Furthermore, there is no equivalent restriction to the zero bound on nominal interest rates, when policy uses taxes rather than interest rates. We conclude that, when …scal policy is used, the zero bound on nominal interest rates does not restrict the set of implementable allocations. In the simple New Keynesian model, as in Eggertsson (2009) , it is possible to achieve the …rst best allocation if the zero bound does not bind, or, alternatively, if taxes are used. This is an extreme result. In more general set ups, full e¢ ciency cannot be attained. It is still the case, though, that the zero bound is irrelevant for both …scal and monetary policy.
We show this by considering an extension of the model where productivity shocks are …rm speci…c or the initial distribution of prices across …rms is non-degenerate. 4 Suppose real rates ought to be negative. Since the nominal interest rate cannot be negative, the only way to achieve negative real interest rates is to generate in ‡ation. This is precisely what the commitment to low future interest rates …rst suggested in Krugman (1998) achieves in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003 and 2004a) . But producer price in ‡ation is costly. Indeed, in the New Keynesian, sticky price, literature, price setting decisions are staggered. Producer price in ‡ation then necessarily leads to dispersion in relative prices-a real economic distortion. Is it possible to achieve negative real interest rates without incurring this economic cost? We show that the answer to this question is a¢ rmative if ‡exible tax instruments are available.
The intuition why tax policy can neutralize the e¤ects of the zero bound constraint is simple. It turns out that the prices that matter for intertemporal decisions are consumer prices, which are gross of consumption taxes. The idea is to induce in ‡ation in consumer prices, while keeping producer price in ‡ation at zero. The result is negative real interest rates, and the distortions associated with producer price in ‡ation are altogether avoided. This can be achieved by simultaneously adjusting consumption and labor taxes. Imagine …rst that producer price in ‡ation is zero. Then a temporarily lower consumption tax generates in ‡ation in consumer prices. The problem is that this change in consumption taxes introduces undesirable variations in the marginal cost of …rms over time: a lower consumption tax reduces the marginal cost of …rms. It also creates incentives for producers to reduce their prices. This e¤ect must therefore be counteracted by temporarily raising the labor tax. Overall, this policy acts as a costless tax on money. 5 It essentially achieves a negative nominal interest rate in the consumer price numeraire.
In a model with capital, this policy must be supplemented with a temporary capital subsidy. This is because a path of consumption taxes which increases over time acts as a tax on capital. This tax on capital is undesirable and must be counteracted with a corresponding subsidy. The goal is to tax money, not capital.
Importantly, because our policy implements the e¢ cient allocation, it is time-consistent: if a future planner were given an opportunity to revise this policy in the future, it would choose not to do so. This should be contrasted with the policy recommendations involving future commitments to low interest rates in Krugman (1998) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003 and 2004a) .
Our policy recommendation requires ‡exibility of taxes. It has been argued that …scal instruments are not as ‡exible as monetary policy instruments. Whether this argument applies to stabilization policy during a "great moderation" period could be argued about. However, it certainly does not apply to exceptional circumstances such as the recent crisis or the Japanese stagnation in the nineties, precisely because the need to use …scal instruments is exceptional. There have been recent policy proposals in this direction by Robert
Hall and Susan Woodward 6 , and earlier on, by Feldstein (2003) , intended at Japan. 7 Both of them suggested lowering consumption taxes as a way to …ght the crisis. Our model formalizes these proposals and highlights the way other taxes must be jointly used.
The paper proceeds as follows: We …rst describe the model, in section 2. In section 3, we characterize the …rst best allocation and show how it can be implemented, away from the zero bound using interest rate policy, and at the zero bound using tax policy. We consider the linearized model in section 4, so that the relation with the literature can be made more clear. We consider a model with capital in section 5. In section 6, we
show that the results can be generalized to environments where it is not optimal (or feasible) to replicate ‡exible prices. In a model with …rm speci…c productivity shocks and/or a non-degenerate distribution of initial prices, it is still the case that the zero bound constraint on nominal interest rates can be overcome using tax policy.
The Model
The model we analyze is a standard new-Keynesian model, similar to the one analyzed by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and (2004b), and Eggertsson (2009). As it has become standard in the New Keynesian literature, the economy is cashless.
The uncertainty in period t 0 is described by the random variable s t 2 S t , where S t is the set of possible events at t, and the history of its realizations up to period t is denoted by s t 2 S t . For simplicity we index by t the variables that are functions of s t .
The preferences of the households are described by:
where
where c it is private consumption of variety i 2 [0; 1], N t is total labor, and t is a preference shock. 6 An article by Justin Lahart in the Wall Street Journal, January Aggregate government consumption G t is exogenous. It is also a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of public consumption of di¤erent varieties g it ,
The production function of each good i, uses labor, n it ; according to
where A t is an aggregate productivity shock.
Total labor is
Government
The government minimizes the expenditure on the individual goods, for a given aggregate, and …nances it with time varying taxes on consumption, c t , and labor income, n t . As is standard in the new-Keynesian literature, we also allow for lump-sum taxes, T t , which is a residual variable that adjusts so that the government budget constraint is satis…ed.
If we let
where p it is the price of variety i, then, the minimization of expenditure on the individual goods, implies
Households
Households also minimize spending on aggregate C t , by choosing the consumption of di¤erent varieties
The budget constraints of households can then be written in terms of the aggregates as
together with a no-Ponzi games condition. B t;t+1 represent the quantity of state contingent bonds that pay one unit of money at time t + 1; in state s t+1 and B h t are risk free nominal bonds. Q t;t+1 is the price of the state contingent bond, normalized by the probability of occurrence of the state at t + 1, and 1 1+it is the price of the riskless bond-so 1 + i t is the gross nominal interest rate. W t is the nominal wage and t are pro…ts. We assume that pro…ts are fully taxed, d = 1.
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The …rst order conditions of the household problem that maximizes utility (1) subject to the budget constraint (9) with respect to the aggregates are
and
Firms
Each variety is produced by a monopolist. Prices are set as in Calvo (1983) . Every period, a …rm is able to revise the price with probability 1 . The lottery that assigns rights to change prices is i:i:d: over time and across …rms. Since there is a continuum of …rms, 1 is also the share of …rms that are able to revise prices. Those …rms choose the price p t to maximize pro…ts
where Q t;t+j is the nominal price at t of one unit of money at a particular state in period t + j, output y t+j = c t+j + g t+j must satisfy the technology constraint and the demand function
obtained from (8) and (7), where
The optimal price set by these …rms is
The price level can be written as
Equilibria
Using the demand functions (8) , (7), it follows that
An equilibrium for fC t ; N t g, fp t ; P t ; W t g, and fi t ; c t ; n t g is characterized by
In addition, an equilibrium condition is that the zero bound on nominal interest rates be veri…ed so that
Here $ j is the share of …rms that have set prices j periods before, $ j = ( ) j (1 ), j = 0; 2; :::; t , and
, which is the share of …rms that have never set prices so far. We assume that they all charge an exogenous price p 1 .
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For now we abstract from the particular way in which monetary policy is conducted, whether it follows a standard feedback rule, a target rule or a simple target for the sequence of nominal interest rates. In what follows we characterize the e¢ cient allocation and the policy variables and prices that are consistent with it.
In Section 4, we explicitly consider an interest rate rule as well as …scal policy rules and discuss uniqueness of equilibria.
E¢ cient allocations
The …rst best allocation is the one that maximizes utility (1) subject to the technology constraints (2), (3), (4) and (5), above.
From (4) and (5), it follows that the marginal rate of transformation between any two varieties is equal to one. Because the marginal rate of substitution is cit cjt 1 , it must be that an e¢ cient allocation satis…es c it = C t , all i, t. 9 We do not need to keep track of the budget constraints, since lump sum taxes adjust to satisfy the budget.
A similar argument applies to public consumption of the di¤erent varieties, so that
The e¢ ciency conditions for the aggregates (C t ; N t ) are fully determined by:
By comparing the e¢ ciency conditions with the equilibrium conditions we can describe the prices and policy variables that are consistent with the e¢ cient allocation.
We now show that there are policies and prices that support the e¢ cient allocation, both away from and at the zero bound. At the zero bound, those policies involve state and time varying taxes. We do this by
showing that there are policies and prices satisfying all the equilibrium conditions, above, for the e¢ cient allocation, taking into account the zero bound constraint on the nominal interest rate.
Policy away from the zero bound.
In this section, we review how monetary policy can implement the e¢ cient allocation with constant taxes on consumption c and labor n .
First, in order to achieve production e¢ ciency, conditions (8) and (7) imply that prices must be the same across …rms pt j Pt = 1. That can only be the case if …rms start at time zero with a common price, p 1 , 10 as we assume, and if …rms that can subsequently change prices choose that common price, so that p t = P t = p 1 . This means that the price level must be constant across time and states. The reason is simple. Because price setting decisions are staggered, in ‡ation necessarily comes at the cost of dispersion in relative prices.
This represents an economic distortion. Avoiding this distortion requires that in ‡ation be zero.
It therefore follows that the aggregate resource constraint (18) becomes (20). From Calvo's price setting condition (16) , it follows that
This implies that
as under ‡exible prices. Thus, the nominal wage must move with productivity so as to maintain the nominal marginal cost constant.
From (15), with constant consumption taxes, we have
1 0 This is the standard assumption. Yun (2005) analyzes the case with initial price dispersion.
so the nominal interest rate must equal the natural rate of interest-the real interest rate that prevails at the e¢ cient allocation.
From (14) and (21), it must be that
implying that
One possibility is to set consumption taxes to zero, c = 0. Therefore labor must be subsidized at the rate 1 n = 1 . This labor subsidy is necessary to neutralize the mark up distortion. Note that the subsidy is constant over time and states.
As long as the natural rate of interest is nonnegative, u C (C t ; N t ; t ) E t u C C t+1 ; N t+1 ; t+1 , the zero bound constraint is not binding and the e¢ cient allocation is implemented with constant taxes and ‡exible monetary rate policy. In this model, in normal times, monetary policy achieves perfect economic stabilization. We now look at the more interesting case where the natural rate of interest is negative.
Policy at the zero bound
We have seen that, in order to implement the e¢ cient allocation with constant taxes, the nominal interest rate must equal the natural rate of interest, and prices must be constant. This implementation breaks down when the natural rate of interest turns negative, because of the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate. With constant taxes, this failure is unavoidable and optimal monetary policy can only achieve a second best allocation. We start by reviewing the policy trade-o¤s confronting the design of monetary policy when the zero lower bound is binding. We then move on to explain how ‡exible taxes can be used to completely circumvent the zero lower bound and implement the e¢ cient allocation.
One strategy is to then set the nominal interest rate to zero as long as the natural rate of interest is negative, and to start raising the nominal interest rate again when the natural rate of interest turns positive.
This strategy results in de ‡ation and hence positive real interest rates when the zero bound is binding, precisely when the natural rate of interest is negative. This de ‡ation comes together with a contraction in output compared to the e¢ cient allocation.
With constant taxes, the only way to achieve a negative real interest rate is to generate in ‡ation. Because price setting decisions are staggered, this necessarily generates dispersion in relative prices. This represents a real distortion and implies that the e¢ cient allocation cannot be implemented. These distortions have to be weighted against the stimulation bene…ts of lower real interest rates in the form of higher output and consumption.
Recognizing this trade-o¤ leads to another strategy whose premise is to supplement zero nominal interest rates with a commitment to keeping nominal interest rates below the natural rate of interest even when the natural rate turns back positive. This commitment to stimulate the economy in the future raises demand today through a wealth e¤ect. Both higher present and future demand induces …rms to raise their prices. This in turn generates in ‡ation, which lowers the real interest rate today and further stimulates the economy. In fact, following Krugman (1998), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003 and 2004a) show that the optimal monetary policy (with constant taxes) precisely follows this strategy. It is important to emphasize that this strategy does not implement the e¢ cient allocation.
Instead if taxes are used, the e¢ cient allocation can be implemented at the zero bound. To see this, we set the nominal interest rate to the natural rate of interest whenever the latter is positive, and to zero otherwise. The intertemporal condition (15) , repeated here with constant prices,
can be satis…ed with the appropriate choice of consumption taxes over time. Similarly, the intratemporal condition (22), repeated here,
can then be satis…ed by the choice of the labor income tax, so that
and the …rst best is achieved.
As long as consumption and labor income taxes are ‡exible instruments, the zero bound is not a constraint to policy. Notice that the tax policies that implement the …rst best at the zero bound do not have to respond to contemporaneus information. Consumption and labor income taxes can be predetermined.
The tax policy that implements the e¢ cient allocation does not involve net taxing or subsidizing. Notice that the present value budget constraint of the households, can be written, replacing prices and taxes from the households marginal conditions (10) and (11), as
The e¢ cient allocation is such that C t = A t N t G t , and u N (t) = A t u C (t). This implies that
Notice that c 0 is unrestricted by the implementation of the e¢ cient allocation whether at the zero bound, or away from it. It is a lump sum tax on the initial nominal wealth of households. The present value of lump sum taxes is equal to the present value of government spending plus the value of initial liabilities. The present value of the other taxes, used to implement the e¢ cient allocation, is zero. This is the case whether the allocation is implemented with interest rates away from the zero bound, or with consumption and labor income taxes. In this sense, tax policy that implements the e¢ cient allocation at the zero bound is revenue neutral.
We now consider a special case of the model-the same considered by Eggertsson (2009) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2009)-and describe optimal tax policy following a shock that lowers the natural rate of interest to the point where the zero bound constraint would be binding. The discussion on alternative policies in this context has focused on the role of government purchases. 11 This is not without a, possibly major, resource loss. Instead, the policy we characterize below deals with the zero bound constraint on monetary policy at no cost. 
Using …scal policy to avoid a recession
In this way, the preference shock does not a¤ect the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. It will, however, a¤ect the marginal rate of substitution between consumption at time t and consumption at time t + 1. We also assume that G t = G, A t = 1, so that the only shock is the preference shock.
Note that in this case, the conditions for an e¢ cient allocation (19) and (20) imply that the …rst best
Therefore the e¢ cient allocation is constant, and is una¤ected by the preference shock.
Let us consider a particular example, a deterministic version of the examples in Eggertsson (2009) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2009). In their models, it is this shock -interacting with the zero bound -that generates a potentially big recession.
Assume that t evolves exogenously according to t t+1 < for t = 0; 1; 2; ::; T 1;
The natural rate of interest is
< 1 if t < T and 1 > 1 for t T . We set the nominal interest rate to 1 + i t = 1 for t T 1 and 1 + i t = 1 for t > T . We set the path of consumption taxes according to And we set labor taxes as follows
Note that, in this deterministic case, there is one degree of freedom in the choice of tax policy: the initial level of the consumption tax c 0 . Given an initial consumption tax, the equations above completely determine the paths of consumption and labor taxes. Consumption taxes increase over time for t < T and then stabilize at some level c for t T . Labor taxes follow the opposite pattern: they decrease over time for t < T and then stabilize at some level n for t T with
The key is that the prices that matter for intertemporal decisions are consumer prices, which are gross of consumption taxes. The idea is to induce in ‡ation in consumer prices, while keeping producer price in ‡ation at zero. The result is negative real interest rates, and the distortions associated with producer price in ‡ation are altogether avoided. This can be achieved by a simultaneous adjustment in consumption and labor taxes.
A temporarily lower consumption tax ( it is important to note that labor taxes must be adjusted in the opposite direction of consumption taxes so as not to distort the intratemporal margin.
Time-consistency
Importantly, because our policy implements the e¢ cient allocation, it is time-consistent. If a future planner were given an opportunity to revise this policy in the future, it would choose not to do so. This should be contrasted with the policy recommendations involving future commitments to low interest rates in Krugman (1998) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003 and 2004a) . These policies involve commitments to "being irresponsible" in the future by keeping the nominal interest rate below the natural rate of interest even when the latter turns back positive. When the future comes, a planner is tempted to renege on these commitments and raise interest rates as soon at the natural rate of interest turns positive.
This represents an additional advantage of ‡exible tax policy. Not only does it deliver a better allocation (the e¢ cient one), it also has the bene…t of not requiring costly commitments that might be di¢ cult to make credible.
The linearized model
In order to relate our results more closely to the literature, we now analyze the log-linearized version of the model. As before, we assume A t = 1, G t = G, and u (C t ; N t ; t ) = u (C t ; N t ) t .
Then, the following equations provide a log linear approximation 12 to the model above:
where t = ln
, and r t = ln 1 + ln t E t ln t+1 . Note that i t and r t are in levels, while the other variables are in deviations to the steady state.
That is only for the convenience of de…ning the lower bound. The steady state has zero in ‡ation, zero growth rate of taxes, and the nominal interest rate equal to the real,{ = r = ln 1 .
We now assume that monetary policy follows an interest rate rule that explicitly takes into account the lower bound on nominal interest rates{
In this linear version of the model, if the parameters of the interest rate rule satisfy the Taylor principle, then given the tax policy, the interest rate rule implements a unique local solution to the linear system.
Consider the case where …scal policy is not used, b c t = 0 and b n t = 0. As long as the lower bound does not bind, movements in the nominal interest rate can fully o¤set the preference shock a¤ecting r t . Indeed, the interest rate rule is de…ned so as to fully insulate output and in ‡ation from this shock, so that in equilibrium, b y t = 0, and t = 0. The intuition is simple: shocks to the real interest rate should be absorbed one to one by changes in the nominal interest rate. In this way, the shock does not a¤ect prices and therefore there is no change in output.
Note, on the other hand, that if the nominal interest rate is zero and there is a large enough negative shock to the real interest rate such that r t < 0, this could result in de ‡ation and, given the price frictions, output would drop. This is why the zero bound on interest rates can be a cost to policy.
Fiscal policy can also be used to respond to the shock, and fully stabilize the economy. Suppose the outcome of the interest rate rule is that the nominal interest rate is zero,{ t = 0. From (24), it is clear that there will be a conditional growth rate of the consumption tax,
that will satisfy the …rst equation for b y t = E t b y t+1 = 0 and E t t+1 = 0. From (25), there is an adjustment on the labor income tax,
that will satisfy the second equation for b y t = 0 and t = E t t+1 = 0. The interest rate rule (26) is satis…ed. 
A Model with Capital
The model can easily be extended to allow for capital accumulation. However, to achieve the …rst best, the tax policy must be enriched to include a tax on income from capital. To do so, assume that investment, I t , is also an aggregate of the individual varieties
Aggregate investment increases the capital stock according to
Minimization of expenditure on the individual investment goods implies
The budget constraints of the households now reads
U t is the rental cost of capital. Note that the tax k t has an allowance for depreciation. We believe this is the most natural assumption. As we will show, it will have implications on the behavior of this tax rate when implementing the optimal allocation.
The marginal condition for capital is
The production function of each good i, y it , uses labor, n it , and capital and is given by
where A t is an aggregate productivity shock and the production function is constant returns to scale.
The …rm choices must satisfy
Let the corresponding cost function be C t = C (y it ; U t ; W t ). This is linear in y it , so that marginal cost is a function of the aggregates only.
where C y (:) is marginal cost, and t;j are the same as in the model without capital.
Market clearing for each variety implies that
while market clearing for capital implies
Using the demand functions (8), (7), it follows that
An equilibrium for fC t ; N t ; K t g, fp t ; P t ; W t ; U t g, and i t ; c t ;
is characterized by (14) , (15), (17), and
As before, we do not need to keep track of the budget constraints, since lump sum taxes adjust to satisfy the budget.
E¢ cient allocations
As before, at the e¢ cient allocation, the marginal rate of technical substitution between any two varieties must be equal to one, so
The e¢ ciency conditions for the aggregates are: 1 3 Since the production function is constant returns to scale,
is the same across …rms,
Policy variables and prices with variable interest rates We …rst set c t = 0. As before, so as to achieve production e¢ ciency, the price level must be constant across time and states. The aggregate resource constraint (38) becomes (41). When P t = P , (36) becomes
so that nominal marginal cost must be constant. Since C y (U t ; W t ) = (14), it must be that
implying that (14) is satis…ed.
and the nominal interest rate must move with the real rate to satisfy
The rental cost of capital satis…es (35). Finally, the tax rate on capital income must be chosen to satisfy the marginal condition for capital (37).
Clearly the capital income tax must be moving with shocks in order to implement the e¢ cient allocation.
It is no longer the case that the e¢ cient allocation can be implemented with constant taxes.
14 It is interesting to note, though, that this is the case because we assume, as is standard, that …rms can deduct depreciation expenses from the capital income tax, i.e., the tax is paid on (U t P t )K t . If, instead, we had assumed that the tax was paid on the gross return U t K t ; the marginal condition for capital would be u C (C t ; N t ; t )
and, setting a constant tax, 1 k t+1 1 = 1, would be consistent with the optimal allocation. 1 4 Standard New Keynesian models usually have labor only and assume taxes are not ‡exible. If instead they considered capital, the non ‡exiblity of taxes would be costly.
Policy variables and prices at the zero bound When the natural rate of interest is negative, the e¢ cient allocation can no longer be implemented with constant consumption and labor taxes. But it can still be implemented with ‡exible taxes.
As before, we set the nominal interest equal to the natural rate of interest whenever the latter is positive, and to zero otherwise. The intertemporal condition, with a constant price level, is as before
which imposes restrictions on the path of consumption taxes. There are multiple paths that satisfy these constraints. The labor income tax will have to move to compensate for the movements in the consumption tax, satisfying condition (42) above.
Now the capital income tax will also have to move to account for the changes in the consumption tax:
Going back to the experiment of Section 3:3, when the zero bound is temporarily binding, we must now supplement consumption and labor taxes with capital taxes. The reason is simple. When capital is introduced in the model, the increasing path of consumption taxes, that is necessary to circumvent the zero bound constraint, acts as an undesirable tax on capital. Its e¤ects on capital accumulation must therefore be counteracted with an o¤setting capital subsidy. This subsidy must remain in place as long as the natural rate of interest is negative (until period T ).
The irrelevance of the zero bound in more general environments
We have shown that tax policy can be used to achieve full e¢ ciency, when nominal interest rates are at the zero bound. In order for this to be the case, it must be that there are no idiosyncratic shocks, that the initial distribution of prices across …rms is degenerate, that pro…t taxes are used to …nance the subsidies to production, and that lump sum taxes are used to …nance government spending. We …nd the extreme case to be particularly illustrative of the point we want to make, but the result is more general. In these cashless economies with sticky prices, whatever policy can do with the nominal rate, can also be done with tax policy.
But tax policy can do more: The zero bound constraint can be made irrelevant. This is the case, regardless of whether full e¢ ciency can be attained. We now make this explicit.
We modify the model in Section 2 and allow for productivity shocks to be idiosyncratic. The production function of each good i, now, uses labor, n it ; according to
where A t is an aggregate shock and A it is an uncorrelated …rm speci…c productivity shock.
Let it 2 f0; 1g be the random variable, such that, if it = 1, the …rm can change the price. The draws are i:i:d: over time and across …rms with E t 1 [A it ] = 1. The …rms that are able to change prices choose the price p it to maximize pro…ts
where output y it+j = c it+j + g it+j must satisfy the technology constraint and the demand function
The price of …rm i is p it = p it if it = 1, and p it = p it 1 , otherwise.
Equilibria
An equilibrium for fC t ; N t g, fp it ; p it ; P t ; W t g, and fi t ; c t ; n t g is characterized by households marginal conditions (14) , (15) with R t 1, the price setting constraint (44), above, the condition for the price level (6), where p it = p it if it = 1, and p it = p it 1 , otherwise, and the resource constraints (45).
If, at time zero, …rm i cannot optimally choose the price, because i0 = 0, then p i0 = p i; 1 , and there is a distribution of these initial prices which is not necessarily degenerate.
The e¢ cient ‡exible price allocation
If prices were ‡exible, then …rms would set prices according to
The aggregate price level would be
; and the resource constraints would be
Substituting the nominal wage from the households intratemporal condition (14), we have
This condition and the resource constraints (46) are the only implementability conditions. The e¢ cient allocation can be achieved by setting 
Implementability with interest rate policy only
We now turn to the sticky price economy. In this section, we restrict the consumption tax and the labor tax to be constant
Then the set of equilibria for fp it ; p it ; P t ; n ; C t ; N t ; Y t g is restricted by
obtained by replacing the nominal wage from (14) into (44);
where p it = p it if it = 1, and
the resource constraints
and the zero bound constraint i t 0.
There are two reasons why the ‡exible price allocation might not be implemented: the zero bound on nominal interest rates and the presence of idiosyncratic shocks. The …rst reason is by now familiar. The second reason is new. With idiosyncratic shocks, at the e¢ cient allocation, the relative price for any two given …rms responds to the relative idiosyncratic shocks that these …rms face so that
Ait . With sticky prices, it is impossible to replicate this volatile pattern of relative prices.
Implementability with both interest rates and tax policy
With ‡exible tax rates, an equilibrium for fp it ; p it ; P t ; c t ; n t ; i t ; C t ; N t ; Y t ,g is restricted by
together with (48), where p it = p it if it = 1, and p it = p it 1 , if it = 0;
(50); and …nally the restriction that the zero bound constraint be veri…ed i t 0.
Condition (51) can be rewritten recursively as
Note that the weight t;0 depends on the path for the consumption taxes.
When ‡exible taxes can be used, the zero bound constraint does not restrict the set of implementable allocations and prices. To see this, consider a sequence for prices and allocations fp it ; p it ; P t ; C t ; N t ; Y t g that satis…es (51), (48), (52), and (50), but does not necessarily satisfy the zero bound constraint. We denote by f c t ; n t ; i t g the corresponding sequence of taxes and nominal interest rates, and we denote by t;0 the quantity de…ned in equation (54) for this allocation.
The same allocation and process for prices can be implemented with another sequence f~ c t ;~ n t ;{ t g for taxes, in such a way that the zero bound constraint is satis…ed. We now explain how to construct consumption and labor taxes that implement the original allocation with the new interest rate{ t = max fi t ; 0g. The key is to construct consumption taxes in such a way that (52) holds and the weights are unchanged,~ t;0 = t;0 .
In order to perform this construction recursively, it is useful to represent the realization of uncertainty as a tree. Consider a history (a node in the tree) and assume that~ c t has been chosen. We construct~ c t+1 across all the possible continuation histories (the descendent nodes) simultaneously in such a way that
# and 1
This can be seen as a system of two equations in the unknowns~ c t+1 . This system always has a solution as long as the two equations are not colinear. A necessary and su¢ cient condition is that
is not constant across the possible continuation histories, or in other words that this date-t + 1 random variable is not predictable at time t. We then set labor taxes as follows
We have proved the following result: modulo a technical condition, every allocation that can be implemented with a combination of taxes and monetary policy that does not necessarily respect the zero lower bound constraint can also be implemented with a di¤erent combination of taxes and monetary policy that does respect the zero lower bound constraint. Our proof can easily be adapted to show the stronger results that the interest rate is a redundant instrument when ‡exible taxes can be used. While the nominal interest rate is a redundant policy instrument when taxes are also used for stabilization, taxes are not redundant instruments. For example, if taxes are not used, then the set of implementable allocations will be restricted by the zero bound on nominal interest rates.
It is important to emphasize that even with ‡exible taxes, the e¢ cient allocation cannot be implemented.
This would require a richer set of instruments, i. e. consumption and labor taxes speci…c to each …rm in the economy.
Conclusions
The main conclusion of this paper is that in the standard New-Keynesian model, the zero bound constraint on nominal interest rates is not a relevant restriction on policy when both …scal and monetary policy are ‡exible. In response to a recent literature on using ine¢ cient monetary or government spending policies to circumvent the zero bound constraint in the New-Keynesian model, we show that tax policy can do that at zero cost.
The argument that …scal policy can neutralize the e¤ects of the zero bound is very simple. Suppose the objective of policy was to lower real rates. If nominal rates cannot be lowered, real rates can still be low if expected in ‡ation is high. Getting all prices to move together in response to aggregate conditions-so expected in ‡ation is high-may come at a cost. Note that the relevant in ‡ation to consider is producer price in ‡ation. Indeed, it may be costly to get all producers in the economy to raise all future prices uniformly.
But in ‡ation arising from a reduction in current consumption taxes (or increases in future consumption taxes) is easy to achieve, can be announced and implemented at zero cost, and brings down real interest rates.
Movements in consumption taxes would in general distort other margins. For this reason we have to use a model where those decisions are explicitly modelled, and allow for other taxes as well. In a standard new-Keynesian model, we show that, if consumption and labor income taxes are both used, it is possible to compensate for the distortions and achieve the …rst best. We then analyze the same economy but with capital accumulation. The main results extend to this case, as long as ‡exible capital income taxes are also used. Importantly, because our policy implements the e¢ cient allocation, it is time-consistent: if a future planner were given an opportunity to revise this policy in the future, it would choose not to do so.
We …rst consider an environment where the …rst best can be implemented, even at the zero bound.
This assumption makes the results particularly stark, but the irrelevance of the zero bound constraint holds more generally. We consider an extension of the model where the full e¢ cient allocation cannot be achieved, because of idiosyncratic shocks or because the initial distribution of prices of the di¤erent …rms is not degenerate. Productive e¢ ciency can no longer be achieved, but tax policy can undo the zero bound restriction on nominal interest rates.
In order for the zero bound to be ine¤ective, taxes must be ‡exible. But, are taxes ‡exible enough?
After witnessing the policy response to the recent crisis in the US and elsewhere, it is hard to argue for lack of ‡exibility of any …scal policy. In any case, our point is also normative, meaning that if taxes were not ‡exible, they should be made ‡exible. There are also many examples of movements in sectorial or state level taxes with the purpose of stimulating spending. Interesting examples are the tax holidays on sales taxes in many states in the US, 16 and programs such as the Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save (CARS) set up in June 2009. 17 We have analyzed these questions in a model with sticky prices but ‡exible wages. It should be clear that our policies can be adapted to an economy with sticky wages, provided that the employer and employee components of the payroll tax can be adjusted separately.
We have analyzed the implications of a particular restriction on the nominal interest rate, that it cannot be negative. But for the economy of a small state in a federation or a small economy in a monetary union, the nominal interest rate is always beyond control. The implications for stabilization policy are similar to the ones we have seen in this paper, applied to an apparently very di¤erent issue. If interest rate policy cannot be adjusted, tax policy can still be, and the constraints on the nominal rate can be made irrelevant.
Common nominal interest rates do not have to be too low or too high.
In the economy we have analyzed, we do not consider good speci…c taxes. And concluded that …scal policy at the zero bound can do as well as monetary policy away from the zero bound. In an environment where di¤erent sectors are hit by di¤erent shocks, or a¤ected di¤erently by common shocks, …scal policy that treats di¤erent sectors di¤erently can do better than monetary policy, whether at the zero bound or away from it. 1 6 It is customary for many states in the US to announce yearly sales tax holidays for speci…c sets of goods. They typically last for only a few days. 1 7 Commonly known as Cash for Clunkers, this was a temporary subsidy for the trading in and purchase of a new, more fuel e¢ cient, vehicle. The initial budget was set to one billion dollars and planned to last for …ve months. Due to the high number of applications, it was terminated after the second month, and the …nal budget was close to three billion.
8 Appendix: The log-linearized model
As productivity shocks play no particular role, we assume that A t = 1 for all t, so (16) becomes
The steady state has C t = C, N t = N , t = 1; c t = c ; n t = n P t = p t = P; 1 + i = 1 so that t;j = (1 ) ( ) j , and ( 1) W = P .
If we log-linearize equation (15) ; using (18) to replace labor, we obtain
(57) where
Linearization of the aggregate resource constraint yields
assuming that government consumption is constant, delivers
So, if we let g 1 = C C+G , then b C t = gb y t ;
If we also assume that the shock t is multiplicative, so = 1; we can write equation ( The log-linearization of the second term in the right hand side is given by ln E t 
Note that if, as we will assume, u C t+j ; N t+j ; t+j = u (C t+j ; N t+j ) t+j ; then = 0: Note also that > 0:
Thus, we can write where b p t = ln pt P . But note that t (j) = ln P t+j P t = ln P t+1 P t P t+j P t+1 = ln P t+1 P t + ln P t+j P t+1 = t+1 + t+1 (j 1) 
But the log linearization of (17) delivers ln P t ' ln P t 1 + (1 ) ln p t so ln P t ln P t ' ln P We assume that the shock t is multiplicative, so = 0. If we let r t = ln 1 + b t E t b t+1 ; the system can be written as with the constraint that{ t 0.
